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I.  Introduction 
In 1991, and after eight years of running a deficit, the United States posted a 
current account surplus of 0.7% of GDP.  That was the last time the current account 
balance was positive.  Since then the U.S. external imbalance has grown steadily.  In 
2005 the deficit was 6.4% of GDP, and it is expected to grow even further during 2006.  
A number of analysts have become increasingly alarmed by these very large external 
imbalances.  Some authors have argued that by relying on foreign central banks’ 
purchases of government securities, the U.S. has become vulnerable to changes in 
expectations and economic sentiments (Feldstein, 2006).  A number of analysts have 
argued that at over 6% of GDP the U.S. current account deficit is clearly unsustainable, 
and that in the next few years it will have to be cut, approximately, in half.
1  Of course, 
from a global perspective, a reduction in the U.S. deficit implies a decline in the rest of 
the world’s collective current account surpluses.  That is, adjustment is required both in 
deficit and surplus nations.  According to the International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook (2005), the “issue is not whether, but how they will adjust (p. 67).”  
A key question is what will be the effect of a major reduction in the U.S. external 
deficit on economic activity.  More specifically, the question is whether there will be an 
orderly adjustment process, with no significant impact on growth and employment, or, 
whether adjustment will create havoc and large dislocations.  The answer to this question 
depends on how rapid adjustment takes place.  If adjustment is gradual and distributed 
through a number of years, neither GDP growth nor employment are likely to be affected 
in a significant way.  If, on the other hand, adjustment is sudden and abrupt, the U.S. and 
the world economies are likely to suffer.  Recently, The Financial Times described the 
likely consequences of an abrupt U.S. external adjustment as follows:
2 
 
“If willing lenders to the US were to dry up [suddenly], the consequences would 
be painful: a plunge in the dollar, a spike in interest rates, higher import prices.”   
 
                                                 
1 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005), Mussa (2004). 
2 “Economists expect to escape a disorderly correction,” Financial Times, January 25, 2006, p. 3.   2
Recent evidence presented in Calvo et al (2004), Edwards (2004, 2005a, 2005b) 
and Frankel and Cavallo (2004) suggests that countries that have experienced sudden 
declines in capital inflows and/or abrupt current account reversals have suffered 
significant reduction in the rate of economic growth.  According to Edwards (2005b), 
industrial countries that experienced current account reversals that exceeded 4% of GDP 
in one year, suffered a short-term decline in GDP per capita growth in the order of 2.9% 
to 3.9%, relative to trend. 
In this paper I use a large multi country data set to analyze the determinants of 
abrupt and large current account reversals.  More specifically, I use a panel random-effect 
probit model to estimate which macroeconomic variables affect the probability that a 
country experiences an abrupt current account reversal.  This analysis is important for 
assessing the likelihood that the U.S. will be subject to a sudden, large and disruptive 
current account correction sometime in the next few years.   
It is important to stress at the outset that the results reported in this paper should 
be interpreted with care.  This is for two reasons:  first, the U.S. plays a unique and 
central role in the international financial system.  Second, in modern times a very large 
country such as the U.S. has never run persistent and very large current account deficits 
(Edwards 2005b).  That is, there are no historical precedents for the current large global 
imbalances.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II I discuss the U.S. 
current account deficit from a historical perspective.  I analyze trends and other countries’ 
experiences.  I look at both the financing of the deficit and at the evolution of the U.S. net 
international investment position (NIIP).  In Section III I provide a summary of the 
international evidence on large and significant current account reversals.  Section IV 
contains new econometric results on the probability of countries experiencing abrupt and 
large current account reversals.  In this Section I discuss how the probability of the U.S. 




   3
II.   The U.S. Current Account Imbalance in International Perspective 
In this section I provide some background information on the evolution of the 
U.S. current account during the last three decades.  In Figure 1 I present quarterly data for 
the U.S. current account balance as percentage of GDP, for the period 1973-2004.
3  I also 
include data on the evolution of the Federal Reserve’s trade-weighted index of the U.S. 
dollar real exchange rate (an increase in the RER index represents a real exchange rate 
appreciation).
4  This figure shows that deficits have become increasingly large since 
1992.  Figure 1 also shows that during the period under consideration the RER index 
experienced significant gyrations.  Finally, Figure 1 shows a pattern of negative 
correlation between the trade-weighted real value of the dollar and the current account 
balance. 
In Table 1 I present data on the current account as a percentage of GDP, and its 
financing for the period 1990-2004.  As may be seen, during the last few years the nature 
of external financing has changed significantly.  Since 2002 net foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows have been negative; this contrasts with the 1997-2001 period when FDI 
flows contributed in an important way to deficit financing.  Also, after four years on net 
positive equity flows (1998-2002), these became negative in 2003-04.  As the figures in 
Table 1 show, during 2003 and 2004 the U.S. current account deficit was fully financed 
through net fixed income flows, and in particular through official foreign purchases of 
government securities.
5 
In Figure 2 I present the evolution of the U.S. net international investment 
position (NIIP) as percentage of GDP.  As may be seen, this has become increasingly 
negative: in 2004 U.S. net international liabilities reached 29 percent of GDP.  An 
important feature of the NIIP is that gross U.S. international assets and gross U.S. 
international liabilities are held in different currencies.  While more than 70% of gross 
foreign assets held by U.S. nationals are denominated in foreign currency, approximately 
95% of gross U.S. liabilities in hands of foreigners are denominated in U.S. dollars.  This 
means that net liabilities as a percentage of GDP are subject to “valuation effects” 
                                                 
3   Parts of this section draw on Edwards (2005a). 
4   This is the Federal Reserve RER index. 
5 See, for example, Martin Wolf’s October 1
st, 2003 article in the Financial Times, “Funding America’s 
recovery is a very dangerous game,”  (page 15).    4
stemming from changes in the value of the dollar.  Dollar depreciation reduces the value 
of net liabilities; a dollar appreciation, on the other hand, increases the dollar value of 
U.S. net liabilities.  Because of this valuation effect, the deterioration of the U.S. NIIP 
during 2002-2004 was significantly smaller than the accumulated current account deficit 
during those two years.  An important policy question refers to the “reasonable” long run 
equilibrium value of the ratio of U.S. net international liabilities to GDP; the higher this 
ratio, the higher will be the “sustainable” current account deficit.  According to some 
authors, the current ratio of almost 30% of GDP is excessive, while others believe that a 
NIIP to GDP ratio of up to 50% would be reasonable.
6  
From an accounting point of view, the current account is the difference between 
savings and investment.  A number of authors have argued that a worsening of a current 
account balance that stems from an increase in investment is very different from one that 
results from a decline in national savings.  Some have gone as far as arguing that very 
large deficits in the current account “don’t matter,” as long as they are the result of higher 
(private sector) investment (Corden, 1994).  The recent deterioration of the U.S. current 
account has largely been the result of a decline in national savings, and in particular of 
public and household savings.  A simple implication of this trend – and one that is 
emphasized by most authors – is that an improvement in the U.S. current account 
situation will not only imply a RER adjustment; it will also require an increase in the 
national savings ratio, and in particular in household savings.  Symmetrically, a 
correction of current global imbalances will also require a decline in Europe’s and 
Japan’s savings rates and/or an increase in their investment rates.
7 
  In Table 2 I present data on the distribution of current account deficits in the 
world economy, as well as in six groups of nations – Industrial, Latin America, Asia, 
Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe – for the period 1970-2001.  As may be seen, at 
almost 6% of GDP the U.S. deficit is very large from a historical and comparative 
perspective.  It is in the top decile of deficits distribution for all industrial countries in the 
first thirty years of floating exchange rates.   
                                                 
6   See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), Edwards (2005a), and Mussa (2004). 
7   That is, the global “savings glut” identified by Bernanke (2005) would have to be reversed.  See 
Greenspan’s Speech to the International Monetary Conference in Beijing, June 6, 2005.   5
Since 1970 the U.S. has been the only large industrial country that has run current 
account deficits in excess of 5%.  This reflects the unique position that the U.S. has in the 
international financial system, where its assets have been in high demand, allowing it to 
run high and persistent deficits.  On the other hand, this fact also suggests that the U.S. is 
moving into uncharted waters.  As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004, 2005), among others, have 
pointed out, if the deficit continues at its current level, in twenty five years the U.S. net 
international liabilities will surpass the levels observed by any country in modern times.   
During the last 30 years only small industrial countries have had current account 
deficits in excess of 5% of GDP: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, Norway and Portugal.  What is even more striking is that 
very few countries – either industrial or emerging -- have had persistently high current 
account deficits for more than five years (Edwards 2005b).   
  In Table 3 I present data on net international liabilities as a percentage of GDP for 
a group of advanced countries that have historically had a large negative NIIP position.
8  
The picture that emerges from this table is quite different than what one finds when 
analyzing current account deficits across countries.  Indeed, a number of advanced 
nations have had – and continue to have – a significantly larger net international 
liabilities position than the U.S.  This suggests that, at least in principle, the U.S. NIIP 
could continue to deteriorate for some time into the future.  However, even if this does 
happen, at some point this process would have to end, and the U.S. net international 
liabilities position as percentage of GDP would have to stabilize.  It makes a big 
difference, however, at what level U.S. net international liabilities do stabilize.  For 
example, if in the steady state foreigners are willing to hold the equivalent of 35% of U.S. 
GDP in the form of net U.S. assets, the U.S. could sustain a current account deficit of 
(only) 2.1% of GDP.
9  If, on the other hand, foreigners’ net demand for U.S. assets grows 
to 60% of GDP – which, as shown in Table 3, is approximately the level of (net) foreign 
holdings of Australian assets --, the U.S. sustainable current account deficit would be 
3.6% of GDP.  Moreover, if foreigners’ are willing to hold (net) U.S. assets for the 
                                                 
8   For the U.S. the data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  For the other countries the data are, 
until 1997, from the Lane and Milessi-Ferreti (2001) data set. I have updated them using current account 
balance data.  Notice that the updated figures should be interpreted with a grain of salt, as I have not 
corrected them for valuation effects. 
9   This calculation assumes a 6% rate of growth of nominal GDP going forward.     6
equivalent of 100% of GDP – a figure that Mussa (2004) considers implausible – the 
sustainable U.S. current account deficit can be as high as 6% of GDP – approximately its 
current level.  Since there are no historical precedents for a large advanced nation running 
persistently large deficits, it is extremely difficult to have a clear idea on what will be the 
actual evolution of foreigners’ demand for U.S. assets.  
  It is worth noting that an analysis for a longer period of time confirms the view 
that the recent magnitude of the current account deficit has no historical precedent in the 
United States.  According to Backus and Lambert (2005) the U.S. ran a current account 
deficit of 5% of GDP in 1815, and a somewhat smaller but persistent deficit during the 
1830s and 1870s.  Greenspan (2004, p. 6) has pointed out that the large deficits during 
the 19
th century were financed with capital flows related to “specific major development 
projects (such as railroads).”  
 
 III.    Current Account Reversals in the World Economy: Empirical Evidence 
A number of authors have concluded that the U.S. current account deficit is 
unsustainable in the long-run.  Even under an optimistic scenario, where foreigners’ 
demand for U.S. securities doubles from its current level, there would have to be a 
significant decline in the deficit.  For example, if the (negative) NIIP were to go from its 
current level of 30% of GDP to 60% of GDP, the sustainable current account deficit 
would be 3.6%.  This is almost three percentage points below its current level.  In reality, 
however, the adjustment is likely to be even larger.  The reason for this is that in order for 
the NIIP to go from -30% to -60% of GDP in a reasonable period of time, the current 
account deficit needs to overshoot its steady state level by a significant margin (Edwards 
2005a). A key question is what will be the nature of this adjustment process?  In 
particular, will the adjustment be abrupt, and thus costly, or will it be gradual?  In this 
Section I summarize the international experience with abrupt and large current account 
reversals in the period 1970-2001.  Although the U.S. case is unique – both because of 
the size of its economy and because the dollar is the main vehicle currency in the world –, 
an analysis of the international experience will provide some light on the likely nature of 
its adjustment.     7
In a recent study, Frankel and Cavallo (2004) concluded that sudden stops of 
capital inflows (a phenomenon closely related to reversals) have resulted in growth 
slowdown.  Crocke, Kamin and Leduc (2005), on the other hand, argue that there is no 
evidence suggesting that reversals have historically been associated with a decline in the 
rate of growth.
10  Their definition of “reversal,” however, is of a rather small turnaround 
in the current account balance.  In a series of papers (Edwards, 2002, 2004, 2005a), I 
have analyzed the impact of current account reversals on economic performance.  I have 
found that countries that experience large and abrupt reversals have experienced drastic 
reductions in investment and in GDP growth.  I also found that if the current account 
adjustment is orderly and gradual, it does not disrupt economic activity in a significant 
way. 
III.1 The Incidence of Reversals:  International Evidence 
In this study I define a “current account reversal” (CAR) episode as a reduction in 
the current account deficit of at least 4% of GDP in a one year period, that accumulates to 
a reduction of at least 5% of GDP over three years.  In Table 4 I present data on the 
incidence of current account reversals for six groups of countries.  As may be seen, for 
the overall sample the incidence of reversals is 6.5%.  The incidence of reversals among 
the industrial countries is much smaller however, at 1.3%.  The advanced countries that 
have experienced current account reversals during the period under study are: Greece 
(1986), Italy (1975), Malta (1997), New Zealand (1975), Norway (1978, 1989), and 
Portugal (1982, 1983, 1985).
11  With the exception of Italy, all of these countries are 
quite small; this underlies the point that there are no historical precedents of large 
countries, such as the U.S., undergoing profound current account adjustments.  An 
alternative way of dividing the sample – and one that is particularly relevant for the 
discussion of possible lessons for the U.S. – is by country size.  I define “large countries” 
as those having a GDP in the top 25% of the distribution in 1995 (according to this 
criterion there are 44 “large” countries in the sample); the incidence of abrupt current 
account reversals among “large” countries is 3.9% for 1971-2001. 
 
                                                 
10  See also Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002). 
11 See Edwards (2005b) for alternative definitions of reversals.   8
III.2    The U.S. Current Account “Reversal” of 1987-1991 
  Between 1987 and 1991 the U.S. current account deficit experienced a significant 
current account correction.  In the third quarter of 1987 the deficit stood at 3.7%, a figure 
that was then considered to be exceptionally high.  During the next three years the deficit 
declined gradually, and in the fourth quarter of 1990 it was 1% of GDP.  During the next 
two quarters, and as a result of foreign countries’ contributions to the financing of the 
Gulf War, the current account briefly posted a surplus of 0.8% of GDP.  The 1987-1991 
adjustment process was accompanied by a major depreciation of the U.S. dollar.  The 
dollar began to loose value in the second quarter of 1985, almost two years before the 
current account deficit began its turnaround.
12  In the period immediately preceding the 
adjustment process (1985-87) the U.S. dollar depreciated significantly in real terms; this 
weakening of the U.S. dollar continued, although at a slower pace during 1987-1991.  
Between the second quarter of 1985 and the second quarter of 1991 the dollar lost 30% of 
its value in real trade-weighted terms.  Although this episode does not qualify as a 
“reversal,” in the sense defined in this paper, it is the closest to a major current account 
adjustment that the U.S. has experienced in modern times.   
During the early part of this episode there was no decline in GDP, nor was there 
an increase in unemployment.  However, during the latter part of the adjustment – 
starting in the second quarter of 1990 – there was a decline in GDP and a marked 
increase in unemployment.  Indeed, GDP stayed below its stochastic trend well into 
1993; unemployment was above its own trend until early 1994.  According to the 
National Bureau of Economic Research in August of 1990 the U.S. entered into a 
recession that lasted until March of 1991.
13    
The Federal Funds interest rate increased significantly during the first part of this 
adjustment episode.  In October 1986 the Federal Funds rate was 5.85%; by March 1989 
it had increased by 400 basis points, to 9.85%.  In June 1989 the Fed cut rates by 25 basis 
points, and began a period of interest rate reduction.  By the end of the adjustment, in 
June 1991, the Federal Funds rate stood at 5.9%.  The yield on the 10-year Treasury Note 
increased significantly in the months preceding the actual current account adjustment.  
                                                 
12  This two-year lag coincides with the conventional wisdom of the time it takes a dollar depreciation to 
affect the current account.  
13  I am not necessarily implying causality in this description of the data.   9
The 10 year Note yield went from 7.1% in January 1987, to 9.4% in September of that 
year – an increase of 230 basis points.  From that time and until March 1989, the yield on 
the 10-year Note moved between 9% and 9.4%.  Starting in April 1989, long term interest 
rates began to fall, reaching 8% in April 1991.  In June 1993, two years after the current 
account adjustment had ended, the long tem interest rate was 6%.  Also, the yield curve 
became inverted in January 1989, and stayed inverted until January 1990.    
The 1987-1991 current account adjustment in the U.S. was significant, but 
gradual.   And although the episode does not qualify as a “current account reversal,” as 
defined in this paper, it does provide some useful information.  This adjustment was not 
characterized by a traumatic collapse in output.  However, the 1987-91 adjustment 
episode in the U.S. was characterized by: (a) a steep depreciation of the U.S. dollar.  (b) 
An increase in inflation.  (c) Higher interest rates; the Fed Funds rate increased through 
the first half of the adjustment, while the 10 year rate increased in the months prior to the 
beginning of the actual adjustment.  (d) A decline in GDP below trend towards the latter 
part of the adjustment.  In fact, the U.S. entered into a recession while the adjustment was 
taking place.  (e) An increase in the rate of unemployment above trend, during the final 
quarters of the adjustment.    
 
IV.   Abrupt Current Account Reversals: Empirical Determinants  
In order to understand further the forces behind abrupt external adjustments, I 
estimated a number of equations on the probability of “large countries” experiencing a 
major current account reversal.  The empirical model is a variance component probit, and 
is given by equations (1) and (2): 
 
1,    if   , 0
* > tj ρ  
(1)   tj ρ         =       




tj ρ    =     tj tj ε αω + .   10
 
Variable  tj ρ  is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if country j in period t 
experienced a current account reversal (as defined above), and zero if the country did not 
experience a reversal.  According to equation (2), whether the country experiences a 
current account reversal is assumed to be the result of an unobserved latent variable
*
tj ρ .  
*
tj ρ , in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on vector tj ω .  The error term  tj ε is given by 
given by a variance component model:   . tj j tj μ ν ε + =    j ν is iid with zero mean and 
variance
2
ν σ ;  tj μ is normally distributed with zero mean and variance  1
2 = μ σ .  The data 
set used covers 44 countries, for the 1970-2001 period; not every country has data for 
every year, however.  See Edwards (2005b) for exact data definition and data sources.   
In determining the specification of this probit model I followed the literature on 
external crises, and I included the following covariates:
14 (a) The ratio of the current 
account deficit to GDP, lagged one period.  (b) The lagged ratio of the country’s fiscal 
deficit relative to GDP.  (c) An index that measures the relative occurrence of sudden 
stops in the country’s region (excluding the country itself).  This variable captures the 
effect of “regional contagion,” and I expect its coefficient to be positive. (d)  Change in 
the logarithm of the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export prices to import prices), 
with a one year lag.   (f) The country’s initial GDP per capita (in logs).  This measures 
the degree of development of the country in question.  If more advanced countries are 
less likely to experience a reversal, its coefficient would be negative.  (e) The one-year 
lagged rate of growth of domestic credit.  This is a measure of the monetary policy 
stance.  (g) A dummy variable that takes the value of one if that particular country had a 
flexible exchange rate regime, and zero otherwise.  
IV.1  Basic Results  
In Table 5 I present the results obtained from the estimation of this variance-
component probit model for a sample of large countries.  As before, I have defined a 
country as being “large” if in the year 1995 its GDP was in the top 25% of the global 
GDP distribution.  As may be seen in equations (5.1) and (5.2), the coefficients of both 
                                                 
14  See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2002).   11
the current account deficit and the fiscal deficit are significantly positive, indicating that 
an increase in these imbalances increases the probability of the country in question 
experiencing an abrupt current account reversal.  All the other regressors in equations 
(5.1) and (5.2) are significantly estimated, and have the expected signs.  The results 
indicate that there is a regional “contagion” effect, and that a deterioration in the terms of 
trade increases the probability of a reversal.  These results also indicate that counties with 
a higher (log of) GDP per capita have a lower probability of a reversal.   
In equations (5.1) and (5.2) the fiscal and current account deficits variables were 
introduced separately in the estimation.  In equation (5.3) I present estimates when both 
variables are included in the same probit equation.  As may be seen, in this case the 
coefficient of the (lagged) current account deficit continues to be positive and significant.  
However, the coefficient of the fiscal deficit ceases to be statistically significant.  This 
result is rather intuitive: higher fiscal imbalances that are not associated with a 
deterioration of the external accounts, do not affect in a significant way the probability of 
an abrupt current account reversal.
15  Finally, the results in equations (5.4) and (5.5) 
suggest that countries with flexible exchange rates have been less likely to experience an 
abrupt current account reversal, and that a more expansive monetary policy has had a 
positive – although statistically marginal -- effect on the probability of a sudden current 
account reversal.  All the estimated models presented in Table 5 performed quite well; 
the pseudo-R
2 ranged between 0.41 and 0.29. 
IV.2  Marginal Effects of Current Account Deficits on the Probability of Reversals 
  An important question in U.S. policy debates is whether the higher current 
account deficits experienced during the last few years have resulted in a higher likelihood 
of the country facing an abrupt adjustment sometime in the future.  This issue can be 
investigated by computing the marginal effect (and standard error) of the current account 
deficit on the probability of an abrupt reversal.  For a probit model these marginal effects 
are estimated as the derivatives of the cumulative normal distribution with respect to the 
corresponding regressor.  These derivatives are then evaluated for given values of the 
independent variables.  An important property of probit models is that marginal effects 
                                                 
15 The significant positive coefficient of the fiscal deficit in (5.2) is picking up the effect of the omitted 
current account variable.    12
are highly nonlinear and are conditional on the values of all covariates.  If the value of 
any of the independent variables changes, the marginal effect of any of them on the 
probability of the outcome variable will also change. 
  In Table 6 I present a series of marginal effects using the coefficient estimates 
from equation (5.3) in Table 5; the z-statistics of these marginal effects are in parenthesis.  
The last row in this Table corresponds to the predicted probability of occurrence of an 
abrupt reversal.  This predicted probability is computed for the same values of the 
independent variables that were used to compute the marginal effects reported in that 
particular column.   
The marginal effects in column (6.1) have been evaluated at the sample means of 
the independent variables (See the footnote in Table 6 for the means values.)  As may be 
seen, a marginal increase in the current account deficit raises the probability of a reversal 
in 1.1 percentage points.  The last row shows that, when evaluated at the sample means, 
the predicted probability of a reversal is a relatively low 2.6%.  Column (6.2) presents the 
marginal effects assuming that the initial current account deficit is 7% of GDP – a figure 
close to the estimated U.S. deficit for 2006 --, and that all other regressors remain at the 
sample means values.  As may be seen, the marginal effect of the current account deficit 
increases to 4.2%.  Moreover, as the last row in Table 6 shows, as a result of the much 
higher current account deficit (7% as opposed to 1.6%), the predicted probability of a 
current account reversal has increased to 16%.  
The next two columns in Table 6 are an attempt to analyze the case of the U.S. in 
greater detail.  Column (6.3) presents the marginal effects and predicted probability 
evaluated for the values of the independent variables corresponding to the U.S. in 1999.  
The corresponding values for these variables are:  Current account deficit = 2.5; fiscal 
deficit = -0.62; “contagion” ratio = 0.048; change in the terms of trade = 10.1; log of 
initial GDP per capita = 9.744.  What is particularly interesting about these 1999 values is 
that at that time the U.S. current account deficit was 2.5%, close to what many analysts 
consider a sustainable level.  Also, in 1999 the U.S. was running a small fiscal surplus.   
As may be seen from column (6.3), when the 1999 U.S. values are used, the 
marginal effect of the current account deficit is less than 1 percent (0.0075).  Moreover, 
as the last row in the Table shows, in 1999 the predicted probability of a current account   13
reversal in the U.S. was a very low 1.7%.  At that time, the predicted probability of the 
U.S. facing an abrupt and large change in its current account balance was negligible.  The 
last column in Table 6 – column (6.4) -- evaluates the marginal effects and predicted 
probably using values for the independent variables that reflect the U.S. situation in mid 
2006.  In computing the marginal effects reported in column (6.4) I use the following 
values: Current account deficit = 7.0; fiscal deficit = 3.0; “contagion” ratio = 0.048; 
change in the terms of trade = -12; log of initial per capita GDP = 9.744.
16   
Two interesting results emerge from the computation reported in Column (6.4): 
first, the marginal effect of the current account deficit on the probability of an abrupt 
reversal has increased significantly, relative to the estimates using the 1999 U.S. values 
(see column 6.3).   Indeed, this marginal effect is now 0.04; in column (6.3) it was only 
0.0075.  This suggests that further increases in the U.S. external imbalance will increase 
significantly the likelihood of an abrupt reversal.  Second, the last column in Table 6 
indicates that the predicted probability of a current account reversal has increased 
substantially in 2006 relative to 1999.  In Column (6.3) in 1999 the predicted probability 
of the U.S. experiencing a reversal was a mere 1.7%; by 2006 this predicted probability 
had jumped to 14.9%.  Although in absolute terms this is still a rather small number, its 
rate of increase has been quite remarkable. 
 
V.    Concluding Remarks 
Never in the history of modern economics has a large industrial country run 
persistent current account deficits of the magnitude posted by the U.S. since 2000.  Most 
analysts have argued that the U.S. cannot continue to run these large deficits for much 
longer.
17  At some point the deficit will have to decline to a more sustainable level.  An 
important question is whether there will be an orderly adjustment process, with no 
significant impact on growth and employment, or whether the adjustment will be sudden 
and abrupt, creating havoc and large dislocations.   
  In order to have an idea of the possible nature of this adjustment process, in this 
paper I have analyzed the international evidence on abrupt and significant current account 
                                                 
16 The deterioration in the terms of trade is the result of the hike in the price of oil in 2005.  I also assume 
that the “contagion” ratio stays at the same level as in 1999. 
17  For an alternative view see Caballero et al (2006).   14
reversals.  The results from the estimation of a number of variance-component probit 
equations indicate that the probability of experiencing a major current account reversal is 
positively affected by larger current account deficits, a deterioration in terms of trade, and 
expansive monetary policies.  On the other hand, this probability has been lower for more 
advanced countries and for countries with flexible exchange rates.  Overall, these results 
indicate that some of the recent developments in the U.S. economy have increased the 
probability of the country experiencing a current account reversal.  An analysis of the 
marginal effects of current account deficits and of the predicted probability of reversal 
indicates that both have increased significantly for the U.S. since 1999.  Using values of 
the key variables, I estimated that the predicted probability of a current account reversal 
in the U.S. has increased from 1.7% in 1999, to 14.9% in 2006.  Although the absolute 
value of this probability continues to be on the low side, its rate of increase has been 
significant and fast.  
It is important to point out once again, that the U.S. case is unique, and the results 
reported in this paper should be interpreted carefully.  This is for several reasons.  First, 
and as pointed out above, there are no historical precedents of a very large industrial 
country running persistent and very large deficits.  This means that there have been no 
“historical experiments” that guide us in the analysis, or in the estimation.  Second, the 
U.S. plays a fundamental role as the center of the international financial system.  This 
means that the global demand for U.S. issued securities is high, and may continue to 
expand.  What we don’t know is for how long the expansion in the demand for U.S. debt 
will continue to grow.  And third, the U.S. deficit is enormous in absolute terms -- in 
2005 it exceeded USD 800 billion – and is being financed by a very large percentage of 
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Figure 2: U.S. Net International Investment Position, 1976-2004
Source: BEA, International Investment Position
(Percent of GDP)
 
 Table 1 
U.S. Net Financial Flows: 1990-2004 
($ Billion) 
 
    1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
                                               
Reserves  (net)  31.8 23.2 44.4 70.4 44.9  100.1  133.4 18.0  -26.7 52.3 42.5 23.1  110.3  250.1  358.1 
                  
Foreign  private  purchases    -2.5 18.8 37.1 24.4 34.3  91.5 147.0 130.4  28.6 -44.5 -70.0 -14.4 100.4 113.4  108.1 
of U.S. treasuries                                              
Currency  18.8 15.4 13.4 18.9 23.4 12.3 17.4 24.8 16.6 22.4  5.3 23.8 21.5 16.6  14.8 
Securities  (net)  -27.2 -10.5 -19.1 -66.2  -6.2 -45.1 -46.0  44.6  32.1 182.6 338.0 309.2 301.4 178.6  323.2 
       Debt securities  -  -  -  -  -  - 13.0 84.2  145.5  104.2  267.7 300.3 269.8 241.8  360.1 
       Equity securities  -  -  -  -  -  -  -36.8 24.7  -30.3 84.5 93.0 12.6 37.5  -63.2 -36.8 
FDI  (net)  11.3 -14.7 -28.4 -32.6 -34.0 -41.0  -5.4  0.8 36.4 64.5  162.1 24.7 -62.4  -133.9  -133.0 
Claims reported by non-banks 
(net) 
17.3  8.0 13.2 11.3  -35.0 14.4  -32.6 -5.2  -15.1  -21.5 31.9 57.6 32.6 55.1 -41.5 
Claims reported by banks (net)  8.6  3.4 37.4 55.7  100.1  -44.9  -75.1  7.9  4.2 -22.0 -31.7  -7.5  66.1  65.2  -15.6 
                                               
Net  financing  58.0 43.5 97.9 81.8 127.4  87.3 138.7 221.3  76.2 233.8 478.0 416.6 569.9 542.7  614.0 
Current account deficit  79.0  -3.7  48.0  82.0 118.0 109.5 120.2 136.0 209.6 296.8 413.4 385.7 473.9 530.7  665.9 
Source: BEA, U.S. International Transactions and International Investment Position 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Current Account Deficits 
By Region: 1970-2001 
 
Region Mean  Median 1
st Perc.  1
st Quartile  3
rd Quartile   9
th Perc. 
            
 A:  1970-2001 
            
Industrialized countries  0.6  0.7  -3.8  -1.6  3.0  4.8 
Latin Am. and Caribbean  5.4  4.1  -2.5  1.1  8.0  16.9 
Asia 3.0  2.7  -7.1  -0.6  6.3  11.3 
Africa 6.3  5.3  -3.4  1.2  9.9  16.9 
Middle East  0.0  1.4  -18.8  -5.0  6.4  13.6 
Eastern Europe  3.9  3.0  -2.4  0.3  6.1  10.7 
            
Total 3.9  3.3  -5.0  -0.1  7.1  13.1 
            
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators.  A negative number 




Net Sock of Liabilities: U.S and other Industrial Countries: Selected Years 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
Country  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Australia  --  --  47.4 55.1 65.2 59.1 
Canada  34.7 36.3 38.0 42.4 30.6 20.6 
Denmark  -- -- --  26.5  21.5  13.0 
Finland  14.6 19.0 29.2 42.3 58.2 35.9 
Iceland  --  --  48.2 49.8 55.5 66.0 
New Zealand  --  --  88.7  76.6  120.8  131.0 
Sweden  --  20.9 26.6 41.9 36.7 26.5 
United States  -12.9  -1.3  4.2  6.2  14.1  22.1 
  Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). 
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Table 4 
Incidence of Current Account Reversals: 1970-2001 
(Percentages) 
 
Region  Type of Reversal 
    
  Reversal 4%  Reversal1 2% 
    
Industrial Countries  1.3  3.3 
Latin American and Caribbean  5.5  9.4 
Asia 8.2  10.7 
Africa 8.8  11.9 
Middle East  10.4  14.9 
Eastern Europe  5.9  7.3 
    
Total  6.5 9.4 
    
     Pearson     
         Uncorrected chi2 (5)  33.8  33.7 
         Design-based F(5, 12500)  6.8  6.7 
          P-value  0.00  0.00 
    
  Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators 
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Table 5 
Current Account Reversals: Random Effects Probit Model – Unbalanced Panel 
Large Countries 
Variable  (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) 
       
Current-Account deficit to GDP  0.165  --  0.174  0.165  0.153 
  (7.51)* -- (7.20)*  (6.43)*  (5.59)* 
Fiscal deficit to GDP  --  0.035  -0.003  -0.002  0.009 
 --  (2.07)**  (0.21)  (0.10)  (0.54) 
Sudden stops in region   2.335  2.731  2.094  2.327  2.261 
 (3.15)*  (3.84)*  (2.73)*  (2.70)*  (2.50)** 
Changes in terms of trade  -0.013  -0.019  -0.013  -0.013  -0.014 
 (2.30)**  (3.50)*  (2.33)**  (2.08)**  (1.92)*** 
Domestic credit growth  --  --  --  --  0.0001 
  -- -- -- --  (1.36) 
Flexible exchange rate  --  --  --  -0.379  -0.298 
  -- -- --  (2.00)*  (1.62)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.127  -0.180  -0.140  -0.104  -0.127 
 (2.18)**  (2.71)*  (2.36)**  (1.69)***  (1.71)*** 
Observations  881 822 822 694 608 
Countries  42 36 40 40 36 
Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses; explanatory variables are one-period 
lagged variable; country-specific dummies are included, but not reported.  
* significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%   20
Table 6 
Current Account Reversals: Marginal Effects and Predicted Probability
a,b 
(Computed from the estimates in Equation 5.3) 
Variable  (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) 
      
Current-Account deficit to GDP  0.011  0.042  0.007  0.040 
 (5.70)*  (4.53)*  (2.69)*  (3.75)* 
Fiscal deficit to GDP  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Sudden stops in region   0.128  0.509  0.090  0.435 
  (2.43)** (2.75)* (2.09)** (2.92)* 
Changes in terms of trade  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
  (2.20)** (2.38)** (2.01)**  (1.87)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.009  -0.034  -0.006  -0.033 
 (2.40)**  (2.44)**  (2.95)*  (2.81)* 
      
Predicted Probability  0.026 0.160 0.017 0.149 
a : For details on the computations in each column, see the text. 
b : Absolute value of z statistics are reported in parentheses. For (6.1) sample means are 
1.567 for current account deficit to GDP, 4.074 for Fiscal deficit to GDP, 0.092 for 
sudden stops in region, 5.459 for changes in terms of trade, and 9.744 for log of GDP per 
capita. 
 * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%   21
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